T he purpose of cost-effectiveness analysis is to provide information that helps decision makers allocate health resources in ways that yield the most health. Health and life are fundamentally importantnecessary conditions for meeting other goals. There are, however, other important goals that have a rightful place in decisions about health care.
In this issue, David Holtgrave raises one of those goals: reducing racial disparities in health and health care. He proposes choosing the elements of a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to promote greater fairness among racial groups and reduce racial disparities in health. Specifically, in HIV/AIDS, he proposes that for the reference case analysis, intervention costs and the incidence of HIV/AIDS be race specific, whereas treatment costs saved and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained (life expectancy and weights) be taken from the general population.
Comparing interventions is at the heart of the decision problem in health and at the heart of CEA. The Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine proposed standards to improve the comparability of CEAs. 1 Central to those standards was the definition of the reference case, which incorporates the panel's detailed recommendations. The panel urged analysts to include reference case results in their reports to make it possible to compare the interventions and target populations evaluated by different studies. Analysts remain free, of course, to include results for other cases they think are important to illuminate the decisions addressed by their study.
The reference case was designed to facilitate fair comparisons. For example, if some analyses include a more comprehensive list of costs than others do, those interventions will appear more expensive, unfairly so; thus, the costs included should be comprehensive and standard across analyses. If some analyses include adverse effects of interventions and others do not, the ones that do will appear less cost-effective relative to the ones that do not. If analyses omit the costs of patient time, interventions that use a lot of patient time will appear more cost-effective than they are, and so on. The point of the reference case recommendations was, and is, not just to support comparisons, but to support fair comparisons.
CEA can and has evolved over the years to do a better-a fairer-job of representing choices in health. Lives saved were replaced, first with life years, then with QALYs, to facilitate comparison of interventions with very different effects on health. The panel recommended the societal perspective to reflect the impact of an intervention on all parties, not just those who receive the intervention. This evolution has raised its own ethical issues, for example, the debate over QALYs versus lives when life-saving interventions are involved. [2] [3] [4] CEA can and will evolve further if the need calls for it. But as further evolution is considered, I think we should proceed carefully and ask some searching questions.
To start, how unfair is CEA, and specifically the reference case, in its current form? The implicit thesis of Holtgrave's article is that conducting CEAs according to the panel's recommendations is likely to be unfair to African Americans and Latinos with HIV/AIDS. Presumably, that means that it would lead to a distribution of health resources less favorable to them than the current distribution.
But the current distribution of resources in the United States is not based on CEA. It is based on a payment system that leaves more than 40 million people with no health insurance and thus with very limited access to care. Within the insured population, some have more generous coverage and better access to care than do others. If health resources were allocated on the basis of CEA, they would unquestionably be more equitably distributed than they are now. 5 Consider the example of the Pap smear. CEA has shown that a onetime Pap smear for elderly African American women saves money, 6 whereas the annual Pap smears that are the standard for well-insured women cost-in today's dollars-more than $2 million per life year compared with less frequent screening. 7 If CEAs were used to allocate resources, the annual Pap smear would be a thing of the past, and women who rarely or never receive Pap smears would get them at least every 5 years.
Even so, if CEA were used to allocate health resources, would it really be fair? Or is it biased in favor of the healthy and well-to-do? The example above suggests not, but there seems to be a widespread suspicion that CEA does favor the healthy and well-to-do.
I think the suspicion arises partly from the undeniable fact that to conduct a CEA, analysts assign different numbers to the life expectancies, health states, treatment costs, wage rates, and so forth of different groups. Some of those numbers reflect unfairness in the larger society. Holtgrave notes, for example, that the panel recommended using the target population's average wage to value the time patients spend on an intervention. If the target population is discriminated against in labor markets, their average wage is lower because of the discrimination. That's unfair, and it rankles.
It is natural and reasonable to fear that using the wage in CEA carries the discrimination into another arena, the allocation of health resources, which could lead to fewer resources for the group, perhaps literally adding injury to insult. In the context of CEA, however, using a lower wage means that the intervention is less costly and will be more cost-effective than for a group with a higher wage. Thus, the lower wage rate does not discriminate against the group in question, in the sense that it does not make the intervention less cost-effective. It would nonetheless be a bad idea to use the wage if it seriously misrepresents the true value of individuals' time.
To pursue that point for a moment, economic theory says that individuals' time should be valued as they value it. The wage rate is proposed because theory suggests that it measures how individuals value their time (not because it measures their productivity in the labor market). The theory reasons that if individuals are free to choose how many hours they work for pay, they will increase their hours until the last hour worked has the same value as the last hour used for other purposes. Under these conditions, the value of nonwork time, the time used for health care, is approximately equal to the wage. There are many reasons why the wage may be a poor approximation: In reality, many individuals work more (or fewer) hours than they would if they were free to choose; the value of an hour at work may be more (or less) than the wage, depending on how the individual feels about the work; and so on. My point is that the wage is proposed as an approximation to the value individuals genuinely place on their time. Holtgrave suggests that for HIV/AIDS programs, in which incentive payments are frequently offered for participation, those incentive payments be used to value time instead. If incentive payments better measure the value individuals place on their time, this is a reasonable suggestion.
To return to the larger issue, I think the perception that CEA is unfair depends in a second way on the numbers used in an analysis. Although no one minds belonging to a group that has a lower incidence of disease, other numbers (such as the wage) carry a negative emotional valence. The valence tends to attach to the level, however, when cost-effectiveness results depend on the differences between levels. An intervention is not more effective for groups with the longest life expectancies but for groups for which the intervention makes the greatest difference in life expectancy. It is not more effective for groups whose health carries the highest QALY weights but for groups for which the intervention makes the greatest difference in health states and thus in QALY weights. An intervention is not less costly for groups with the lowest intervention cost per patient but for groups for which the intervention makes the greatest difference in costs.
Although he does not present evidence to that effect, Holtgrave clearly believes that without modification, reference case cost-effectiveness results could lead to an unfair distribution of health resources. As noted above, to avoid this outcome, he proposes that for HIV/ AIDS, intervention costs and cases of disease avoided be estimated from data for the target group but that treatment costs avoided and QALYs gained by preventing disease be based on data for the larger population. These changes would, he argues, ensure that racial disparities in access to care and life expectancy do not unduly influence cost-effectiveness ratios. They would, in effect, build a redistributive goal, the reduction of racial disparities, into the reference case.
If there were agreement not only on the goal but also on how to achieve it, then it would make perfect sense to alter CEA accordingly. But, as Daniels and Sabin have observed, there are ethical issues in health care that command general agreement but for which disagreement is vigorous over how to proceed from generality to specifics. 8 They noted that people in many countries agree that the sickest should receive priority over the less sick but not on how much priority they should receive. Most people have rejected the extreme positions-that the sickest should have no special priority or that they should invariably have top prioritybut the range of disagreement remaining is wide. Daniels and Sabin suggested that where there is substantial disagreement on how to achieve a goal, it is premature, indeed impossible, to create an automatic, quantitative decision-making procedure. CEA remains an aid to decision making, not the decision maker.
Most people believe that the sickest should receive priority. Most people also believe that racial disparities in health care should be reduced or eliminated. Holtgrave's proposals would require more: a detailed consensus on how medical resources should be distributed and exactly how the goal of reducing racial disparities should influence that distribution. Without that level of agreement, redistributive goals cannot be encoded in CEA.
Equally or more important, changing the reference case for HIV/AIDS but not for other interventions would undermine the purpose for which the reference case was created: valid comparison. Reference case results that use different principles for different interventions are no longer reference case results-they do not allow valid comparisons of interventions. The logic of the reference case dictates that the same principles be followed for all interventions and all target populations.
Holtgrave stresses the use of sensitivity analysis, and I would suggest that the way to a better solution lies there. Rather than redefining the reference case for a single disease, analysts could use sensitivity analysis to explore the implications of the issues Holtgrave raises. The panel urged analysts to include other cases as they saw the need, and this is the kind of situation that calls for such supplementary information. Sensitivity analyses that focus on the implications of racespecific data could provide a basis for exploring the issue of how to address racial inequities. It is the prerogative of any analyst to include such analyses in a report. Beyond that, analysts, or the decision makers who fund and use analyses, could discuss whether certain kinds of supplementary results are so valuable that they should be included routinely.
For the present, I think racial inequities are not amenable to the application of precise rules for distributive justice. Instead, distributional decisions are best made through the kind of open and transparent "fair process" outlined by Daniels and Sabin: a process that considers the views of all stakeholders. The reference case was intended to provide information to such a process. Analyses that include a reference case, defined as the panel defined it, and supplementary analyses that address distributional concerns could contribute to fair process, to fair decisions, and to the future evolution of CEA.
